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SOME EFFECTS OF NONRECOGIZNED LOSSES
ON CORPORATIONS AND THEIR
SHAREHOLDERS
J. DUANE GILLIAM*
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 denies recognition of losses to
a corporate taxpayer in respect of sales or exchanges of corporate prop-
erty, when the property is acquired by certain persons directly or in-
directly as a result of the sale, when the property is transferred to
another corporation pursuant to a plan of reorganization of the transferor
corporation, or when the property is sold or exchanged pursuant to cer-
tain plans of liquidation. Such nonrecognition of loss may result in
(1) no reduction of the taxable income in the year of sale; (2) no
operating loss carryback upon which to claim a refund of income taxes
paid for prior taxable years; (3) no operating loss carryover to reduce
taxable income in subsequent taxable years; (4) no reduction of taxes
imposed on capital gains of the year of sale; or (5) no capital loss
carryover to reduce taxes on capital gains of subsequent years. This
nonreduction of the taxes imposed upon the corporate taxpayer would
prevent an increase1 in the net worth of the corporation, thereby pre-
venting an increase in the interest of each shareholder and prejudicing
the interests or security of the creditors of the corporation.
This article is concerned with (1) certain of the circumstances under
which a loss will not be allowed to a corporation in respect of a sale of
property at a price less than its adjusted basis; (2) the effect of the
denial of a loss upon the interests of the various shareholders and credi-
tors; (3) the possibility of placing restrictions on sales of corporate
property in order to avoid the nonrecognition of a tax loss; and (4) the
possibility that changes should be made in the present revenue laws to
remove inequities.
(A) CERTAIN LOSSES ON SALES OR EXCHANGES OF CORPORATE PROP-
ERTY NOT RECOGNIZED FOR TAX PURPOSES.
Certified Public Accountant (N. C.) and Member, Student Board of Editors,
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.
'Whether the result of no decrease in taxes would properly be termed as "pre-
venting an increase" in the net worth of a corporation, or as "resulting in a
direct decrease" in the net worth, would depend upon whether in theory income
taxes were considered as an expense of earning income, or as a levy on earnings
that had already been realized.
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(1) Sales or Exchanges of Property to Certain Persons Except in the
Case of Distributions in Liquidation.
Section 267 (a) (1)2 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
that no deduction shall be allowed in computing taxable income "[i]n
respect of losses from sales or exchanges of property (other than losses
in cases of distributions in corporate liquidations), directly or indirectly,"
between persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of sub-
section (b)." One pair of persons so referred to is "[a]n individual
and a corporation more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock
of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such individual."'4
In determining if an individual owns more than 50 percent in value of
the outstanding stock of a corporation, section 267 (c) provides for
"constructive" ownership 5 of stock, whereby stock not actually owned
by an individual shall be considered as being owned by him in enu-
merated instances.
The transferor is thus denied any deduction for a loss on the sale
or exchange of its property, but by the provisions of section 267 (d) the
transferee may utilize any part of the loss disallowed to the transferor
as an offset against any gain realized by the transferee on a later sale
by the transferee.7 "[Section 267 (d) ] does not affect the basis of the
2INT. RE;v. CODE OF 1954, § 267 (a) (1). In the remainder of this article
"section" or "§" followed by a section number will refer to a section of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. unless a different citation is indicated.
'See McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 694 (1947). The husband, who
managed his wife's business affairs, ordered his broker to sell certain stock for the
account of one of the two and to buy on the same day at as nearly the same price
as possible the same number of shares of the same stock on the other's account.
While the identity of the third persons involved in the sales was never known to
the husband and wife and the one spouse received different certificates from those
the other spouse had sold, the transaction was held to be an indirect sale between
the husband and wife, and no loss was allowed to the selling spouse on the sale
of his stock.
' Section 267 (b) (2). Section 267 (b) (3) provides that no gain or loss shall
be allowed in respect of sales or exchanges between "[tiwo corporations more
than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or
indirectly, by or for the same individual, if either one of such corporations, with
respect to the taxable year of the corporation preceding the date of the sale or
exchange was, under the law applicable to such taxable S'ear, a personal holding
company or a foreign personal holding company." The discussion in this article
relating to possible prejudice to the interests of certain shareholders as a result of
nonrecognized losses applies equally if the provisions of § 267 (b) (3) apply.
' The provisions of § 267 (c) are sometimes referred to as "rules of attri-
bution."
' "The loss not previously allowable is the difference between the adjusted basis
of the property for determining loss in the hands of the transferor and the portion
of the purchase price properly allocable to the property ' H. R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A66 (1954).
" "The benefit of the provision is limited to the original transferee. If the prop-
erty is given away the donee does not come within the terms of the provision. If,
however, the property is disposed of in a transaction in which other property is
received, the basis of which is determined by reference to the basis of the original
property, subsection (d) is applicable to reduce the amount of gain to be recognized
on a future disposition by the taxpayer of the other property." Ibid.
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property for determining gain, and consequently depreciation and other
items which depend upon that basis are also unaffected." 8  The basis
of the property to the transferee is the cost to the transferee, and, unless
the property is disposed of by the transferee at a price in excess of the
adjusted cost to the transferee, the loss disallowed to the transferor is
forever lost to both parties. Section 267 relates only to losses, and gains
from sales or exchanges of property between the persons specified in
section 267 continue to be recognized.
Provisions for nonrecognition of losses between certain related
persons first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1934.10 The Ways and
Means Committee reported that the practice of creating losses through
transactions between members of a family and close corporations had
been frequently utilized for avoiding the income tax and that the pro-
posed provisions would close this loophole of tax avoidance by denying
such losses.-"
The need for the provisions of section 267 to deny losses on sales
or exchanges of property where there is absence of a good faith dis-
position of the property at a price determined by arm's length negotia-
tions cannot be denied, but the provisions are subject to criticism' 2 since
they make no distinction between transactions lacking good faith and
those involving the utmost good faith.13 Good faith transactions at a
sale price determined through arm's length dealing between the enu-
merated related individuals will not result in an allowable loss, while a
sale to a trusted, but unrelated, friend will result in an allowable loss if
there is no repurchase agreement.14
8 Ibid.
'Sections 61 (a) (3) and 1002.
" Revenue Act of 1934, § 24 (a) (6), 48 STAT. 691 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §§ 267 (a) (1), (b) (1), and (b) (2)). In Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S.
473 (1939), it was held that a sale by a taxpayer to a corporation wholly owned
by him did not result in a deductible loss. The case involved a 1932 transaction,
and the court held that the explicit denial of such a loss contained in the Revenue
Act of 1934 did not mean that the law formerly was otherwise.
H. R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1937).
m See Note, Nondeductible Capital Losses and Bona Fide Sales Under the
Federal Income Tax, 49 YALE L. J. 75 (1939); Moore, When Is a Sale Not a
Sale? 25 TAXES 326 (1947); Stapleton, Losses Between Related Taxpayers
Under Section 24 (b), 31 TAXES 902 (1953).
"' "Moreover, we think the evidential problem was not the only one Congress
intended to meet. [Section 267] states an absolute prohibition-not a presumption
-against the allowance of losses on any sales between members of certain desig-
nated groups. The one common characteristic of these groups is that their mem-
bers, although distinct legal entities, generally have a near-identity of economic
interest. It is a fair inference that even legally genuine intra-group transfers were
not thought to result, usually, in economically genuine realizations of loss, and
accordingly that Congress did not deem them to be appropriate occasions for the
allowance of deductions." McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 694, 699 (1947).
" A taxpayer may sell assets at a price representing their reduced market
value solely for the purpose of realizing a tax loss, but the sale must be real and
bona fide, and not merely pretended, such as a "sale" with a repurchase agreement.
See Shoenberg v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 446 (8th Cir. 1935).
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If the general wisdom of eliminating any arm's length test is ac-
cepted, the fact remains that when the property is sold or exchanged
by the transferee the "group"'15 may have sustained an economic loss
attributable to the transferor's holding period, no part of which will
ever be recognized for tax purposes unless the transferee receives con-
sideration in excess of his adjusted basis-and in that event only to the
extent of the excess. Likewise, if the property is subject to depreciation
or cost depletion, the "group" may realize an economic diminution of
capital by losing depreciation or depletion deductions based upon the
adjusted basis of the transferor at the time of the sale, as the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 allows as a deduction only an amount of deprecia-
tion or depletion computed with respect to the adjusted basis of the
transferee.
The provisions of section 267 have withstood the test of time and
the constitutionality of the provisions is not subject to question. Con-
gress has the power to limit allowable deductions in this manner without
applying a test of "arm's length" or "good faith" to the sale and the
determination of the sale price.' 6
(2) Sales or Exchanges of Property and Corporate Reorganizations.
Sections 354, 361, and 368 contain some of the principal provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relating to tax-free corporate re-
organizations. Section 354 provides a general rule of nonrecognition of
gain or loss on an exchange of stock or securities in a corporation solely
for stock or securities in the same corporation or another corporation
which is a party to the reorganization, when the exchange is made in
pursuance of a plan of reorganization. Section 354, then, relates to
the nonrecognition of gain or loss to shareholders or security holders of
corporations which are parties to a plan of reorganization.
Section 361 provides a general rule of nonrecognition of gain or loss
if a corporation which is a party to a reorganization exchanges property
solely for stock or securities in another corporation which is a party to
the reorganization, when the exchange is made pursuant to a plan of
reorganization.
Sections 356 and 361 further provide that if other property or money,
in addition to the stock or securities specified in sections 354 and 361,
'" The persons enumerated in the provisions of section 267 (c) appear to be
treated as one economnic entity, or "group," ignoring the individual legal property
rights of the individual members. See note 13 supra.
"0 "Unquestionably Congress has power to condition, limit, or deny deductions
from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax." Helvering
v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U. S. 371, 381 (1934). "The power to tax
income . . . extends to gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions
shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace ... and a taxpayer seeking a
deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes
within its terms." New Colonial Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 440 (1934).
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is received in the exchange, the exchange shall not for that reason
alone be excepted from sections 354 and 361. In such a case, if the
exchange results in a gain, the gain shall be recognized-but only in an
amount not to exceed the money and fair market value of the "boot"
property received; if the exchange results in a loss, it is not recognized.
Under both sections 354 and 361 it is necessary that there be a
"reorganization," 17 a "party to a reorganization,"'" and a "plan of re-
organization." The term, a "plan of reorganization," is not defined by
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, but it is explained in the final
Regulations.
"The term 'plan of reorganization' has reference to a consuin-
mated transaction specifically defined as a reorganization under
section 368 (a). The term is not to be construed as broadening
the definition of 'reorganization' as set forth in section 368 (a),
but it is to be taken as limiting the nonrecognition of gain
or loss to such exchanges or distributions as are directly a part
of the transactions specifically described as a reorganization in
section 368 (a). Moreover, the transaction, or series of trans-
actions, embraced in a plan of reorganization must not only come
within the specific language of section 368 (a), but the readjust-
ments involved in the exchanges or distributions effected in the
consummation thereof must be undertaken for reasons germane
to the continuance of the business of a corporation a party to the
reorganization. Section 368 (a) contemplates genuine corporate
reorganizations which are designed to effect a readjustment of
continuing interests under modified corporate forms."' 9 (Em-
phasis supplied.)
With reference to records to be kept and information to be filed
with returns of income, the Regulations provide that "[t]he plan of
reorganization nust be adopted by each of the corporations parties
thereto; and the adoption must be shown by the acts of its duly consti-
tuted responsible officers, and appear upon the official records of the
corporation. '20  (Emphasis supplied.) However, the intention of the
regulation surely must be to prescribe acts that are required of the
taxpayer if the taxpayer is to claim that there has been a tax-free re-
organization, and not to provide a device whereby "the taxpayer could
intentionally omit the adoption of the plan by either of the corporations
17 The term is defined in § 368 (a).
" 'The term is defined in § 368 (b).
11 U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (g), T. D. 6152 (1955). The provisions of the
section are taken verbatim from the regulation applicable to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, with the substitution of corresponding sections of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.
" Id. § 1.368-3 (a). This provision is new in the 1955 Regulations.
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and claim, in a situation where doing so would be to its advantage, that
an actual reorganization did not meet the requirement of being pur-
suant to a "plan" of reorganization.
The meaning of a "plan of reorganization" is extremely important.
Such a plan is required by the provisions of sections 354 and 361 and
its presence or absence may benefit the transferor and prejudice the
transferee, or vice versa, depending on the circumstances. If the transfer
is for a consideration in excess of the transferor's adjusted basis, the
transferor may assert that there was a reorganization and recognize
no gain, while the transferee may assert that there was an ordinary sale
or exchange in order that its basis in the property will be its cost. If
the transfer is for a consideration less than the transferor's adjusted
basis, the transferor may contend for an ordinary sale or exchange on
which it may recognize a loss, while the transferee may insist that there
was a reorganization and that it acquired the basis of the transferor.
Such conflicting interests as to the ultimate receipt of the tax advantages
may well be at stake if the shareholders of the transferor and transferee
are not identical or do not own the same proportionate interests in the
two corporations, while a question of timing of benefits may exist even
if the shares are owned in the same proportion by the same people.
The courts in construing the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 found
no requirement that the plan be written or formal, 2' if the plan in fact
existed and could be satisfactorily proved. However, if a plan does in
fact exist, it is a simple matter for each corporation formally to adopt
and record the plan. This could avoid trouble with the Commissioner
and would evidence the intentions of the shareholder groups with con-
flicting interests.
Provisions for tax-free reorganizations were introduced into the
revenue laws in 1918 and expanded in 1921 to "permit business to go
forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions. 12 2 The
need for such provisions where there is a legitimate business purpose
for the reorganization is unquestionable. However, incident to the
statutes, there are possible prejudicial effects on the interests of some
of the shareholders and the corporation's creditors.238  Further, there
2
"Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F. 2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U. S. -
77 Sup. Ct. 34 (1956).2
-. R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921).
"'U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2 (g), T. D. 6152 (1955) seems to put the em-phasis of the meaning of a "plan of reorganization" on the existence of a con-
suminated result, while § 1.368-3 (a) would appear to emphasize the formulation
of an intention that there be a reorganization. If only the consummated result
is necessary, without the formulation of an intention to achieve the result, then
might not an "accidental" reorganization result, as regards the expectations of
the shareholders? Jf the shareholders of a transferor knew that a reorganiza-
tion would result from a transfer of its property, that the transferor would notbe permitted to recognize a loss on the transfer, and that the transferee would
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may be similar prejudicial effects, in one instance, from what the
present writer regards as a misinterpretation (or lack of explanation)
in judicial determination of the scope of the provisions.2 4
In the case of an exchange of property with an adjusted basis in
excess of the consideration received in the exchange, if there is a re-
organization, not only does the corporation transferring the property lose
the benefit of a deductible loss and a possible tax reduction or refund,
but also the corporation receiving the property acquires the basis of
the transferor2 5 and can thereafter deduct depreciation and compute
gain or loss on a later sale with respect to a basis in excess of its
"cost." When property with an adjusted basis in excess of its market
value is exchanged in a reorganization, then, the possibility of realization
of a tax benefit by the transferee is much greater than in the case of a
section 267 transfer, while the possible loss of tax benefits to the trans-
feror in both cases is the same.
(3) Sales or Exchanges of Property in Connection with Certain Corpo-
rate Liquidations.
Section 337 provides that "[i]f (1) a corporation adopts a plan
of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954, and (2) within the
12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan,
all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquida-
tion, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be
recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of
property within such 12-month period. '26 Installment obligations are
excepted; and inventories are also excepted, unless substantially all of
the inventories are sold to one person in one transaction.2
Section 337 was introduced into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
acquire the basis of the transferor in the property, these factors could very well
influence their decision as to making a sale, or as to the sale price demanded for
the property.
In Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F. 2d 288 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 56 (1956), discussed infra, it was held that
shareholders owning 75.9% of the total stock of a corporation could, as individuals,
form a "plan of reorganization," after all of the shareholders in a formal share-
holders' meeting had voted for an ordinary liquidation and dissolution. The court
found the consummated result of a reorganization. If the "reorganized" corpora-
tion may acquire benefits previously held by the "old" corporation, and if it is not
necessary that all the "old" shareholders acquire an ownership interest in the "re-
organized" corporation, or even to know of the "reorganization," then would not
the reorganization provisions of the Code aid one group of shareholders in effecting
a "squeeze play" on another group of shareholders, if the first group of share-
holders may form their own private "plan of reorganization?"
" See note 68 infra with respect to Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 231 F. 2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 56 (1956).
" Section 362 (b).
a' Section 337 (a).
'7 Section 337 (b).
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to clarify the problems raised in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,28
and United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co.29 In the latter case the
Supreme Court said: "Congress having determined that different tax
consequences shall flow from different methods by which the share-
holders of a closely held corporation may dispose of corporate property,
we accept its mandate. It is for the trial court, upon consideration of
an entire transaction, to determine the factual category in which a
particular transaction belongs."30  The purpose of section 337 is to
provide a definitive rule relative to recognition of gains or losses to
corporations on sales or exchanges incident to liquidation, and to remove
any impression that the tax consequences arising from sales made in the
course of liquidations should depend upon the formal manner in which
the transactions are arranged.3 '
The law previous to section 337 presented a trap for the unwary
with respect to a net gain on sales of corporate property incident to
liquidation, as an advantage might have been obtained if a transaction
were consummated in one form, while the advantage might not have been
allowed if the same result were accomplished by a different form of
transaction. The "trap" would appear to have been lack of knowledge
28 324 U. S. 331 (1945). The taxpayer corporation negotiated for sale of its
sole asset, an apartment house, and received a down payment after reaching an
oial agreement of sale. Upon advice of counsel that a sale by the corporation
would result in the imposition of a large capital gains tax on the corporation, the
apartment house was distributed as a liquidating dividend to its two shareholders.
Thereupon, the apartment house was sold by the shareholders to the same pur-
chaser, the purchaser being given credit for the down payment made to the
corporation. The Tax Court (Court Holding Co., 2 T. C. 531 (1943)) found as a
fact that the sale was made by the corporation. The Supreme Court held that "the
Tax Court was justified in attributing the gain from the sale to respondent corpora-
tion. The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction. The
tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of property are not finally
to be determined solely by the means employed to transfer legal title. Rather,
the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commence-
ment of negotiations to the consummation of the sale is relevant." Commissioner
v. Court Holding Co., supra at 334. Since the Tax Court found from the facts
of the entire transaction that the sale was made by the taxpayer corporation, the
Commissioner's assessment was upheld.
338 U. S. 451 (1950). The taxpayer, a closely held corporation, transferred
property to its shareholders as a liquidating dividend in kind. The shareholders
then transferred the property to a purchaser. The Commissioner assessed and
collected a capital gains tax on the sale from the taxpayer corporation. In suit
for refund of the taxes, the Court of Claims (Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. v.
U. S., 113 Ct. Cl. 460, 83 F. Supp. 843 (1949)) found that the method used by the
corporation to dispose of the property was avowedly chosen in order to reduce
taxes, but that the corporation's existence was terminated by the liquidation and
dissolution, and the sale was in fact made by the shareholders. The Supreme
Court held that Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945), was
not to be interpreted as meaning that a corporation could be taxed on a sale
made by its shareholders following a genuine liquidation and dissolution, and,
accepting the finding of fact made by the Court of Claims, held that the sale was
not taxable to the taxpayer corporation.
30 United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U. S. 451, 456 (1950).
H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A106 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1954).
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on the part of a taxpayer of the advantageous method and the effects
thereof. If property was distributed to shareholders as a liquidating
dividend, which distribution was followed immediately by sales of the
property made in fact by the shareholders, then a single tax on a net
gain with reference to the basis of each shareholder in his stock was
imposed at the shareholder level.3 2  However, if such sales were made
directly by the corporation, after which the proceeds of the sales were
distributed to the shareholders as a liquidating dividend, or if such sales
were made in fact by the corporation, although the shareholders acted
as a "conduit" in the transactions in transferring legal title,33 a double
tax would be imposed. A tax would be imposed on the net gain (with
reference to the basis of the corporation in the property) on such sales
at the corporate level, and a tax on the net gain on sales (less taxes
paid by the corporation) at the shareholder level, to the extent that
liquidating dividends should exceed the adjusted basis of the particular
shareholder in his stock. Thus, a "wary" taxpayer could obtain an ad-
vantage through planning the form of a transfer. No problem should
have been presented with respect to net losses, as the logical means to
effect such transfers would have been a sale by the corporation which
owned the property, and this means would have been the most ad-
vantageous.34
Under section 337 it is not necessary that property be first dis-
tributed to shareholders as a liquidating dividend and then disposed of
by the shareholders, in order that a tax should be imposed on a net
gain at the shareholder level only. Such sale may be made by a corpora-
tion incident to complete liquidation without recognition of gain to the
the corporation, but the plan of complete liquidation must be formally
adopted by the shareholders, and the business must be wound up (with-
in the meaning of the section) within a period of twelve months. Since
section 337 applies to "sales," it is of no consequence that negotiations
have taken place previous to the adoption of such plan of liquidation, 35
2 United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U. S. 451 (1950). See note
29 supra.
"s Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945). See note 28
supra.
"Amounts distributed by a corporation in liquidation are considered as pay-
ment in exchange for the stock. Irx. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 331. Whether the
shareholder received an amount of cash in liquidation, or received assets of the
same fair market value and subsequently sold them for cash, his gain or loss on
exchange of his stock in liquidation would be the same. If the fair market value
of the property were less than the corporation's adjusted basis in the property, and
the corporation made the sale, then the corporation would have an allowable de-
duction for a loss on the sale, unless the sale came within section 337 of the
1954 Code. The allowable deduction would be of no benefit to the corporation
unless it had taxable income in the year of sale or for one or both of the two
preceding years against which the loss could be offset. However, the corporation
could not be prejudiced by the loss, even if it could not utilize it.
"U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (a), T. D. 6152 (1955).
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or that a contract to sell has been entered into prior to adoption of such
plan, if "title and possession of the property has not been transferred
and the obligation of the seller to sell or the buyer to buy is con-
ditional."38
One professed purpose of section 337 is to remove a "trap for the
unwary" whereby double taxation might result.3 7 The remedy adopted
is to allow all taxpayers who comply with the simple requirements of
the section the benefits which previously had been available only to tax-
payers who adopted a method of direct sale by the shareholders.
Would the literal wording of section 337 and the Regulations ap-
plicable thereto38 permit a corporate taxpayer (a) to sell all its property
with a fair market value less than its adjusted basis and claim loss
deductions for the recognized losses incident thereto, and (b) later to
adopt a section 337 plan of complete liquidation, sell all its property with
a fair market value in excess of its adjusted basis, and recognize no
gains under the provisions of section 337? Neither section 337 nor
the Regulations would appear to prevent this maneuver. Of course, this
same result could have been accomplished under the ruling announced
in Cumberland Public Service, unless the courts had found that such an
arrangement was not in accord with the spirit of the revenue laws.
However, section 337 may now provide complete statutory authority
for such a scheme, with section 1002 providing for recognition of losses,
and section 337 for nonrecognition of gains.
Section 337 may also present a trap for the "unwary." Section 337
applies not only to gains, but also to losses, and there appears to be no
limitation whereby the section does not apply to a net loss. Definite re-
quirements for the applicability of the section are provided; that is, a
plan of complete liquidation must be adopted and completed within a
period of twelve months. It is not provided that the applicability of the
section shall be at the election of the taxpayer s9 If a corporation owns
only property with a fair market value less than its adjusted basis, or if
"Ibid. In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945), the
taxpayer corporation had entered into an oral agreement of sale of real property.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of the corporation that the sale was
not made by the corporation, as the oral agreement was unenforceable under the
Florida statute of frauds, and the first enforceable agreement of sale was made
by the shareholders. Section 337 applies only to sales made after the adoption
of the described plan of liquidation. Query whether a sale of real property
would come within the section, if an oral agreement, unenforceable in the lex
loci ret sitar, were made before the adoption of the plan of liquidation, but a
written agreement was not signed until after the adoption of the plan? It would
appear that the obligation of "the seller to sell or the buyer to buy" would be
conditional until the written contract was signed.
H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A106 (1954).
U. S. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.337-1-7-5, T. D. 6152 (1955).
"Section 337 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized in the described
instances.
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total losses on aggregate sales incident to liquidation would exceed total
gains on such sales, then, if a plan of complete liquidation were formally
adopted and the plan were accomplished (within the meaning of the
section) within twelve months after its adoption, it would appear that
the corporation would be "caught in the web" of section 337, and the
net loss on aggregate sales incident to liquidation could not be recog-
nized. Such a result would not prevent double taxation, but would deny
allowance of a single loss. If Congress determines to allow one tax-
payer to avoid a "double" tax, such determination would not appear
to justify denying another taxpayer a legitimate loss!
The writer ponders whether, in theory, it is not unfortunate that
Congress made section 337 applicable to both gains and losses, without
providing for recognition of a net loss to a corporation on its complete
liquidation. The only use that could be made of such net loss would
be to reduce the corporation's taxable income for the year of liquida-
tion with, perhaps, also a net operating loss to be carried back not more
than two years. The question then arises as to whether a gain or loss
on sale of an asset may actually represent an adjustment of profits of past
periods.
The only period of time for which the extent of financial success or
failure of a business enterprise may be determined exactly is the entire
life span of such business enterprise-after complete realization on its
non-cash assets. In order that owners, the Government, and other in-
terested parties might be informed of its financial progress, accountants
prepare statements, ordinarily at least annually, to set forth the financial
condition of a business as at a certain date and the results of opera-
tions over a period of time. However, it is everywhere recognized that
many of the amounts shown on such statements are only informed
estimates, and that the statements do not purport to set forth the
financial condition of a business from a liquidation or realization ap-
proach; rather, a balance sheet is prepared based upon a "going con-
cern" concept and "cost" principles. In depreciation accounting the
objective sought by the accountant is a fair allocation of the total cost
of use of an asset for a period of time over the same period of time
which is benefited by such cost and use. An accountant understands
that a balance sheet does not purport to set forth the fair market value
of a depreciable asset as at the balance sheet date, but rather presents
the cost of a depreciable asset, from which is deducted the portion of
such cost that has been charged as expense to prior periods, and yields
a balance sheet "value" equal to (a) cost to be charged against earnings
of future operating periods and (b) the estimated disposal value of the
asset at termination of use.
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These principals of accounting are carried over into the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 and are inherent in section 167. Section 167
allows as a depreciation deduction an allowance for exhaustion, wear
and tear, and obsolescence of business property;40 the section does not
prescribe a deduction for "decline in market value" of depreciable assets
during the taxable year. Several methods are authorized by section
167 for computing depreciation expense. The use of one or more of the
depreciation methods may result in the actual fair market value of a
depreciable assef appearing on the balance sheet at some particular
balance sheet date, but such result would be wholly accidental, as
such is not the purpose of depreciation accounting.
If the adjusted basis of a depreciable asset is greater than its dis-
posal proceeds at termination of its normal use,41 the difference can
only be accounted for as due to insufficient claims for depreciation dur-
ing the time of its use, or as due to general deflation. If a depreciable
asset is disposed of prematurely, as would probably be the case in most
liquidations, one should not be surprised if there is a variance between
the adjusted basis and the fair market value. It should be clear that
any variance attributable to "over" or "under" depreciation is an ad-
justment to previously estimated expenses (costs), to determine the
actual expense (cost) of use of the asset over the period of actual use.
Even if the variance is attributable to general inflation or deflation, would
not any variance still be an adjustment to the cost of use of the asset?
It must be remembered that the owner has been claiming a deduction
for estimates of depreciation expense during prior taxable periods. Un-
less a "value of the dollar" approach is to be adopted, which would re-
quire an entire revamping of the revenue laws, is not the difference be-
tween the acquisition cost of an asset and its disposal proceeds the
true cost of using the asset for the period of time it was held? If this be
true, it could only follow that a sale of a depreciable asset at a sale
price different from its adjusted tax basis produces an adjustment to
depreciation expense claimed for prior taxable periods, and, since the
estimated amounts of expense for prior periods were deducted from
income realized in those periods, should produce an adjustment of taxable
income of the prior periods.
Why, then, should gains on sales of depreciable or depletable property
incident to complete liquidation of a corporation not be treated as an
adjustment to amounts claimed by the taxpayer as ordinary expenses
of prior taxable periods-and therefore as ordinary income? It may
Sections 611 and 613 provide a deduction for depletion of "wasting" assets.
A decline in value could also be produced by a loss (as distinguished from
use) such as by fire. Section 165 (a) allows as a deduction "any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."
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be sufficient to answer that Congress chose to confer a benefit, or tax
windfall, on corporations realizing such gains (or recognizing such ad-
justments) in liquidation. To criticize the nonrecognition of gain
provisions of section 337 would elucidate a like and, at least, equal
criticism of section 1231, which under certain circumstances effectively
permits a taxpayer to treat a gain as capital, where such "gain," in the
case of depreciable or depletable property, represents an adjustment of
excessive ordinary expenses allowed to the taxpayer in prior years.
However, justification of nonrecognition of net gain on dissolution
to one corporate taxpayer as an act of grace on the part of Congress
would not appear to justify the denial of a deduction for a net loss to
another corporate taxpayer. If a sale (or series of sales) is made in
complete liquidation of all the depreciable and depletable assets of a
corporation, whereby the corporation does not realize total proceeds
equal to the total adjusted bases of such assets, the net loss would appear
to represent an adjustment of estimated profits, if any, previously re-
ported for the business enterprise. This fact is particularly obvious with
respect to assets which are subject to depreciation or cost depletion, but
in any case a net loss would represent a decline in value during the
period the corporation held the assets with a profit making motive,
as a result of use of the assets, a change in market conditions, general
deflation, or any combination thereof.
Any fears that might have been entertained by Congress that such
losses might not be "real" and "bona fide" should have been at least
partially suppressed by the protections for the Government which are
found in sections 267 and 361.
The writer has some doubts as to whether Congress actually intended
that section 337 should apply to a net loss, although the section would
appear clearly to provide that a net loss may not be recognized. The
purpose of Congress in enacting section 337 was to ameliorate what de-
veloped to be an inequity to "unwary" taxpayers (or "wary" taxpayers,
if due to the number of shareholders involved it would not have been
feasible to distribute the property of the corporation as a liquidating
dividend in kind) in effecting a liquidation of a corporation, whereby the
form of transfer would result in taxability or nontaxability of a net gain
to a corporation.
42
But the applicability of section 337 to net losses would present an
obstacle to no-one but the "unwary." Section 337 does not apply
unless a plan of liquidation is formally adopted and completed within
a twelve month period. It would appear to be a simple matter for a tax-
payer who was aware of the scope of section 337 to avoid the provisions
of the section by adopting a plan of liquidation which could not, or
42 H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A106 (1954).
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would not, be completed within a twelve month period after its adop-
tion 48 either by spreading the sales over the longer period, or by failing to
distribute all the assets within twelve months. 44 The factual require-
ments that must be existent in order that the section should apply would
appear to indicate an intention to confer a benefit-and not to provide
a possible penalty, as would be the case if the section applies to a net
loss, due to the ease by which a corporation may avoid the section. If
section 337 were intended by Congress to apply to a net loss, the writer
doubts whether the section removed a trap for the "unwary."
(B) EFFECT ON THE RESPECTIVE INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS OF NON-
RECOGNITION OF LOSSES ON SALES OR EXCHANGES OF CORPORATE
ASSETS.
(1) Section 267 Nonrecognized Losses on Sales or Exchanges Between
Certain Related Persons.
The effect on the interests of shareholders in the event of non-
recognition of a loss under section 267 can easily be illustrated by a
hypothetical case. Assume that X Corporation, incident to replacement,
intends to sell an old plant and the land on which it is situated. The
adjusted basis of this property is $75,000.00 and the market value is
$40,000.00 Assume further that X will have taxable income of
$100,000.00 for the year of the sale before considering any loss on the
sale.
The shareholders of X are as follows:
Percent of total shares
Percent of total shares actually owned and
actually owned constructively owned
A (childless) 20 57
A's wife 6 26
A's brother (only living
brother or sister of A) 1 51
A's father (widower) 30 81
" "Ordinarily the date of adoption of a plan of complete liquidation by a corpora-
tion is the date of adoption by the shareholders of the resolution authorizing the
distribution of all the assets of the corporation (other than those retained to meet
claims) in redemption of all of its stock." U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (b), T. D.
6152 (1955). However, if the shareholders adopted the plan in advance of com-
mencement of actual liquidation proceedings, in order to escape the provisions of
§ 337, it could well happen that a court would determine that the "plan" was
actually "adopted" upon commencement of active steps toward liquidation.
" "Section 337 shall not apply in any case in which all of the corporate assets(other than those retained to meet claims) are not distributed to the shareholders
within 12 months after the date of the adoption of a resolution by the shareholders
authorizing the distribution of all the corporate assets in redemption of all the
corporate stock." Ibid.
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A's father's brother (only
living brother or sister
of A's father) 30 60
Other shareholders who do not
bear to any of the above
shareholders any of the rela-
tionships set forth in
section 267 (c) 13
Total 100
By the provisions of section 267, if the sale is made to A, A's
brother, A's father, or A's father's brother for $40,000.00, or for any
other price, no loss deduction will be allowed to X. If the sale is to any-
one else, X will have an allowable loss of the difference between its ad-
justed basis in the property and the sale price.
So far as concerns X as an entity, it will be in as good a monetary
position if it sells to anyone other than one of the indicated four for
$2,083.33, as if it sold to one of the four for $40,000.00. 45 If the property
is sold for its market value to anyone other than one of the four, X will
ultimately realize the $40,000.00 sale price plus a tax saving of
$18,200.00,46 or total economic benefits of $58,200.00, as a result of the
disposition. X may thus sustain a financial "loss" if the property is sold
to one of the four.
If X, though having taxable income in the year of the sale, were
insolvent, this loss could very well fall on its creditors; but, absent
insolvency, the reduction of the corporation's net worth could still
prejudice the creditors by diminishing their security.
This is not strictly a case of purchase by majority shareholders
versus purchase by minority shareholders, as A's brother actually owns
only one percent of the total shares. 47 Section 267 would apply equally
"X is subject to income tax of 30% on $25,000.00 and 52% on $75,000.00 of
its taxable income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11. If the sale produces a recog-
nizable loss, X will realize from the deduction a tax saving of 52% of the amount
of the loss. If the property is sold for $2,083.33, there will be a loss deduction of$72,916.67. The $2,083.33 sale -price plus the $37,916.67 tax saving (52% of$72,916.67) would result in an economic benefit of $40,000.00 from the disposition.
These calculations are based on the premise that X had no § 1231 gains
during the taxable year. If X had net gain from § 1231 transactions in the year
of sale, then a tax saving of only 25% of the loss on the sale would be realized.
INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1201.
" Fifty-two percent of the $35,000.00 loss. But see note 45 supra regarding
the possible effect of § 1231.
'
7 It is not necessary that the purchaser actually own a majority of the stock.
The provisions of § 267 apparently assume congeniality and cooperation always
between members of a family, partners, etc., and willingness of a member of a
family or a partner to sacrifice his own interests for the benefit of a fellow
member of the family, partner, etc., as the basis for the rules of attribution.
"Congress inaugurated legislation based on the premise that in certain types of
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if the property were purchased by A's son, A's mother, another brother
of A, an'other brother of A's father, or A's grandparents on his father's
side, if tlese persons existed, even though the purchaser did not own any
shares of X.48
The purchaser could realize a tax advantage for himself as a
result of the purchase only if the property appreciated in value due to
market conditions or general inflation, or if the purchaser acquired the
property in the first instance at a price less than the true market value.40
(2) Section 361 Nonrecognized Losses on Exchanges Incident to
Corporate Reorganizations.
In the case of a statutory merger or consolidation or a recapitalization
the state legislatures and courts have provided safeguards to protect
the interests of the shareholders and creditors. Statutes in many states
have reduced the common law requirement of unanimous assent of the
shareholders for a statutory merger or consolidation or for a sale of a
profitable business and dissolution of the old corporation, but the statutes
permit shareholders dissenting from the action to demand that the
corporation pay them for their shares. The value of the shares of the
transactions the likelihood of bad faith is sufficiently great to warrant their uni.
versal disregard as establishing tax deductions." Note, Nondeductible Capital
Losses and Bona Fide Sales Under the Federal Income Tax, 49 YALE L. J.
75, 77 (1939). However, reference to a few legal battles involving probate of a
will or settlement of a partnership will quickly show that a willingness to sacri-
fice personal interests does not always exist.
In Thomas Zackek, 8 T. C. 1056 (1947), the Tax Court held that a loss of a
mortgagor as a result of an involuntary foreclosure sale of mortgaged property did
not constitute an allowable deduction since the mortgagor's interest in the property
was purchased by a member of the mortgagor's family.
However, in McCarty v. Cripe, 201 F. 2d 679 (7th Cir. 1953), the taxpayer was
allowed a deduction when the taxpayer's farm was sold for taxes. The farm was
purchased by a trustee with money furnished by the taxpayer and shortly there-
after conveyed to a corporation more than 50% of the stock of which the taxpayer
owned. The court cited McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 694 (1947),
where it was decided that the provisions relating to sales between the persons
now described in § 267 stated an "absolute prohibition" against the allowance of
any loss on a sale between the individuals. The court distinguished McWilliams
as the sale was not a sale between the taxpayer and the trustee, but was "a judicial
sale to satisfy public liens for taxes and improvement assessments made by the
Ohio county sheriff acting under appropriate court order." McCarty v. Cripe,
supra at 683. Did not the taxpayer have the same economic control over the
property after the sale as he had before the sale, based on the economic control
assumptions of § 267? Would the court have reached the same result if the tax-
payer had himself purchased the property at the sale?
48 Section 267 (c).
'9 Section 267 specifically excepts distributions in corporate liquidations from
its scope. Thus, a shareholder described in the section may treat a liquidating
dividend as payment in exchange for his stock under § 331 and recognize a loss,
if any, at the time of the distribution. However, in the case of a corporate sale
of assets incident to liquidation, with the proceeds being distributed to the share-
holders, it is the distribution of the proceeds that constitutes the "distribution in
liquidation," and not the transfer of assets through realization sale incident to
liquidation. Matthews v. Squire, 59 F. Supp. 827 (W. D. N. D. 1945).
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dissenting shareholders will be appraised in accordance with the pro-
visions of the statute and the corporation must purchase such shares
at that value.50
Since dissenting shareholders cease to have an ownership interest
in the corporation, but have a claim against the corporation for the
appraised value of their shares,51 they would be unaffected by the
subsequent denial of a loss to the corporation under section 361 when
the corporation transferred property to another corporation, pursuant to
a plan of reorganization, at a consideration less than its adjusted basis.
In some situations inequity might result to dissenting shareholders, un-
less tax advantages rejected by the majority were considered as property
to be assessed and valued in appraising the value of the shares. This
could occur if, pursuant to the plan, the corporation transferred prop-
erty which bad an adjusted basis in excess of market value, while the
corporation had earnings for the year of the sale (or taxable income
for the two years preceding the sale), to which a loss on an ordinary
sale could be applied. In such case it is possible that, if there were a
liquidation instead of a reorganization, the liquidating dividend which
could be paid from the proceeds of sale of the assets, plus the tax re-
ductions or refunds, would exceed the value of the shares as an owner-
ship interest in a going concern.52 In order to obtain such a tax re-
duction or refund, however, the corporation would have to avoid section
337.53
Likewise, an inequity would result to the shareholders assenting to
the merger or consolidation or the sale of the business unless tax ad-
vantages were considered as property in certain cases to be valued in
determining a proper basis for the merger or consolidation, or a proper
sale price for the going concernfr4 The tax consequences might not be
given proper weight if the majority shareholders held substantial in-
" See 13 Am. Jui., Corporations §§ 1186-87, 1214-32 (1938) ; 19 C. J. S.,
Corporations §§ 1611-16 (1940); STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATONS §§ 125, 128 (1949); BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 281-86 (1946).1 See note 50 mpra.
For a hypothetical example, see note 72 infra.
to As already indicated, § 337 provides for nonrecognition of gains or losses on"
sales or exchanges of property incident to a plan of complete liquidation accom-
plished within a period of twelve months after its adoption. If a corporation held
property with an adjusted basis in excess of its market value and had taxable in-
come for the year of sale or the two preceding years against which a loss on sale
could be offset, the corporation might find it advantageous to adopt a plan of
liquidation which would not be completed within twelve months.
" However, if the principal purpose of the transferee in acquiring the assets
is to secure a tax deduction, credit, or other tax allowance, then the transferee
might not be allowed the benefit of the deduction, credit, or other allowance, unless
the transferor corporation or its shareholders owned 50% or more of the total
value of all classes of stock of the transferee corporation immediately before the
sale or exchange of the property. See INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 269 (a).
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terests in the acquiring corporation, or if the shareholders were not
apprised of the tax consequences when the bargain was made.
Even if tax consequences were not considered in making the bargain,
the possible inequity to any individual shareholder could be balanced
by a future benefit if the individual shareholder had an ownership in-
terest in the corporation receiving the assets. The net result for any
particular shareholder would depend upon the proportionate ownership
interest held by him in each of the two corporations.55
The recent case of Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner,0
which was decided under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, held that a transfer, which according to conventional corpora-
tion law would be an ordinary sale incident to corporate liquidation
and dissolution, 57 resulted in a "reorganization" of the transferor of the
property for tax purposes, with consequent nonrecognition of loss.
The case is indicative of the prejudicial results to the shareholders
of the transferor who have no ownership interests, or have smaller
proportionate interests, in the transferee, upon nonrecognition of a
loss upon a transfer of property.
Petitioner was in the business of distilling whiskey. In 1948, due to
an unfavorable business outlook for the future, the petitioner's share-
holders authorized the directors to liquidate the assets and dissolve the
corporation. The directors were authorized to sell the petitioner's non-
inventory assets58 at public auction, after which the proceeds of the
sale and the other assets59 of petitioner were to be distributed pro rata
to the shareholders. The auction was widely publicized by display
advertisements in various newspapers, and brochures were sent to all
of petitioner's shareholders and other persons who might be interested.
The non-inventory assets had an adjusted basis of $793,508.54 in the
hands of petitioner.
Of petitioner's stock at the time of the auction, 75.9 percent was held
by eight "principal" shareholders as follows:
"A shareholder of the transferor corporation would not necessarily need to
own a percentage of the total shares of the transferee corporation equal to the
percentage of the total shares he held in the transferor corporation, in order to
recoup fully his proportionate share of the tax benefits lost to the transferor
corporation. An allowable deduction is worth nothing for tax purposes unless
the person having the right to the deduction has taxable income against which
he can offset the deduction. The transferee might ultimately actually utilize total
deductions in excess of those that the transferor could have utilized, resulting in a
greater total tax saving to the transferee than would have inured to the trans-
feror.
re231 F. 2d 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 56 (1956).
" See note 50 supra.
"8 The non-inventory assets consisted of the distillery, fixtures, machinery, good-
will, and labels.
"Among the other assets was a bulk whiskey inventory having a fair market
value approximately $1,700,000.00 in excess of the basis to petitioner. Pebble
Springs Distilling Co., 23 T. C. 196, 197 (1954).
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Percent of total
shares owned
President, his wife, and his brother 35.1
Secretary and treasurer, his wife, and his brother 35.8
Vice-president and his wife 5.0
Total 75.9
The other 24.1 percent of the stock was held by 657 "public" share-
holders.
One week before the auction the "principal" shareholders met and,
according to their testimony, in order to insure a sale of the plant at the
auction and to prevent a sacrifice sale, decided to organize another
corporation, Old Peoria Building Corporation, and, in the absence of any
bid at least as high, to make a bid at the sale on behalf of Old Peoria
of $242,080.00 for all the non-inventory assets. The only bid at the
sale was this one on behalf of Old Peoria, 60 to which the non-inventory
assets were thus sold. 61 Many of petitioner's "public" shareholders and
other persons were present at the sale.
Old Peoria's charter authorized it, among other things, to engage
in the business of distilling whiskey. After acquiring the property, Old
Peoria rented parts of the plant for dead storage, but it did not, prior
to the hearing in the Tax Court, engage in the distillery business.
On its tax return, petitioner claimed a loss of $551,428.54 (the
$793,508.54 adjusted basis less the $242,080.00 sale price). This claim
resulted in a net operating loss which was carried back to its two pre-
ceding tax years, and petitioner received a refund of the entire amount
($144,034.76) of income taxes paid for those two years. Litigation
resulted when the Commissioner disallowed the net operating loss carry-
back and demanded repayment of the $144,034.76.
The Tax Court 2 sustained the Commissioner and found: (1) that
0' Old Peoria paid $194,208.36 in cash and assumed two mortgages and taxes
of petitioner for the balance of the purchase price.
"At the sale the auctioneer declared the property to be sold to Mr. Robert
L. Silberstein (the president of petitioner), his nominee or nominees. Mr. Silber-
stein was bidding on behalf of Old Peoria, but it had not been completely organ-
ized, and the question arose as to whether the sale was to Silberstein individually,
or to Old Peoria. The Court of Appeals found that the sale "was not actually
made, under the published terms of the auction, until the bid was accepted by the
owner-petitioner" and that since Old Peoria's charter had been issued prior to
acceptance and approval by Petitioner's directors, the sale was made to Old Peoria.
Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F. 2d 288, 292 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 56 (1956).
If the sale had been found to have been made to Silberstein as an individual,
the Commissioner had claimed disallowance in the alternative under Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 24 (b) (1) (B), 53 STAT. 16 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 267 (b) (2)).
2Pebble Springs Distilling Co., 23 T. C. 196 (1954), aff'd, 231 F. 2d 288
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 56 (1956).
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petitioner's assets were transferred to another corporation, Old Peoria;
(2) that one or more shareholders of petitioner controlled Old Peoria by
owning 80 percent or more of its stock; (3) that the steps by which
the transfer was made resulted in a "clear plan of reorganization,"
although there was no written or formal plan of reorganization;08 (4)
that it was unimportant that Old Peoria carried on a different business
from that carried on by petitioner, since it had power under its per-
petual charter to engage in the former business, whether it did so or
not; (5) that there was no break in the continuity of ownership, Old
Peoria being organized, not to assist in the liquidation of petitioner's
assets, but to carry on the business of petitioner; (6) that the transfer
was made "pursuant to a plan of reorganization within the meaning
of section 112 (g) (1) (D)"; 6 4 and (7) that under the provisions of
section 112 (b) (3)65 no loss could be recognized.
In reviewing the decision, the Court of Appeals examined section
112 (b) (3)66 which had been relied on by the Tax Court, introduced
section 112 (b) (4), (c), and (e)67 into its opinion, and concluded that
"[a]n analysis of all of the evidence in this case and of the relevant
03 The Tax Court did not cite a precedent for its conclusion of law that
75.9% of the shareholders may informally decide that there shall be a reorganiza-
tion, consummated by their purchase of the assets, after 100% of the shareholders
have voted at a formal shareholders' meeting that there should be an ordinary
liquidation and dissolution, with the non-inventory assets being sold at public
auction to any person who should make the highest bid. Liddon v. Commissioner,
230 F. 2d 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 34 (1956), must be
distingiushed as in that case all of the shareholders in a shareholders' meeting de-
cided that the assets of the "old" corporation should be transferred to the "new"
corporation. If this action was a plan of reorganization, then all of the shareholders
voted for it. In Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), each
shareholder in the "old" corporation received an ownership interest in the "new"
corporation.
The conclusion of the Tax Court creates a serious question. It did not declare
what absolute minimum percentage of stock ownership is required before indi-
viduals may get together away from the other shareholders and form a "plan of
reorganization."
Another interesting question is whether or not the shareholders of an "old"
corporation can split into groups, with each group planning its own reorganization,
if some of the shareholders are members of more than one group, making a
majority in each group.
The case also presents a very serious problem as to the meaning of a "plan of
reorganization." Taxpayers must now wonder who may form a "plan of reorgani-
zation," as well as what is a "plan of reorganization."
" Peeble Springs Distilling Co., 23 T. C. 196, 202 (1954). Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 112 (g) (1) (D), 53 STAT. 37 (now INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 368 (a)
(1) (D)) does not purport to define a "plan of reorganization," but defines a
"reorganization." Does the Tax Court's conclusion mean that a "plan of re-
organization" means nothing more than the consummation of a result defined in the
section as a "reorganization?" Was the Congress merely being redundant when
it required both a "reorganization" and a "plan of reorganization?"
" Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112 (b) (3), 53 STAT. 37 (now INT. REv. CoE oF
1954, § 354 (a)). See note 68 infra for discussion.
"Ibid.
'7Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 112 (b) (4), (c), (e), 53 STAT. 37 (now IxT. REv.
CoDE oF 1954, §§ 356 (a), (c), 361 (b)). See note 68 infra for discussion.
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sections68 of the Code convinces us that there was a proper basis for
the conclusion of the Tax Court that on the transfer here in question the
" All references to "section" or "§" in this footnote refer to Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 112, 53 STAT. 37.
"SEC. 112. RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS-
"(b) EXCHANGES SOLELY IN KIND--
"(3) Stock for stock on reorganization.-No gain or loss shall be recognized
if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance
of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such
corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization. (Emphasis
supplied.)
"(4) SAME-GAIN OF CORPORATION. No gain or loss shall be recognized if a
corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation a party
to the reorganization. (Emphasis supplied.)
"(e) Loss FROM EXCHANGES NOT SOLELY IN xiND.-If an exchange would be
within the provisions of subsection (b) (1) to (5) . . . of this section if it were
not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of property
permitted by such paragraph to be received without the recognition of gain
or loss, but also of other property or money, then no loss from the exchange shall
be recognized. (Emphasis supplied.)
"(g) DEFINITION OF REORGANIZATION.-As used in this section
"(1) The term 'reorganization' means . . . (D) a transfer by a corporation of
all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer
the transferor or its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which
the assets are transferred. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
"(2) The term 'a party to a reorganization' includes a corporation resulting
from a reorganization and includes both corporations in the case of a reorganiza-
tion resulting from the acquisition by one corporation of stock or properties of
anbther.
"(h) DEFINITION OF CONTROL. As used in this section the term 'control' means
the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 per centum of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 per centum of
the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation."
The Court of Appeals did not specifically indicate whether it based the dis-
allowance of the loss on § 112 (b) (3) or § 112 (b) (4), but it considered the
"relevant ' sections, whatever they were.
Assuming that shareholders of petitioner were in "control" of Old Peoria in
accordance with § 112 (h) and that there was a reorganization within the meaning
of § 112 (g) (1) (D), these facts by themselves do not deny the loss. The Tax
Court applied § 112 (b) (3). Pebble Springs Distilling Co., 23 T. C. 196, 200
(1954). But § 112 (b) (3) applies to an exchange of stock or securities solely
for stock or securities, while the instant transaction involved an exchange of
corporate property for money and assumption of debt. The choice must not have
been inadvertent, however, as the Tax Court set out § 112 (b) (3) in the margin.
The Tax Court cited Walter S. Heller, 2 T. C. 371 (1943), aff'd., 147 F. 2d
376 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 868 (1945), but that case involved
a shareholder and not either of the corporations.
The Court of Appeals may well have had some doubt as to the applicability of
§ 112 (b) (3) to the transaction, for it introduced §§ 112 (b) (4) an (e) into
its opinion, although these subsections had not been mentioned by the Tax Court.
Section 112 (b) (4) applies only if a corporation (i.e., an owner of corporate
property-the shareholders own stock and may own other securities in the corpora-
tion, but they do not own the corporate property that is exchanged in a reorganiza-
tion) which is a party to a reorganization (§ 112 (h)) exchanges property solely
for stock or securities. Recognizing that the exchange made by petitioner was not
solely for stock or securities, the Court of Appeals then looked to § 112 (e) which
clearly states that if an exchange would meet § 112 (b) (4) except for the fact
that the property received consisted not only of property permitted to be received
by § 112 (b) (4) (i.e., stock or securities), but also of other property or money,
no loss shall be recognized (i.e., the provisions of § 112 (b) (4) shall be
carried out). A literal interpretation of the "not only-but also" language
52 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol.35
claimed loss by the petitioner could not be sustained."69  (Emphasis
supplied.)
As a result of the decision in the case, petitioner lost a tax benefit
of $144,034.76. 70 Petitioner, regarded as an entity, would have been
of § 112 (e) would seem to indicate that the receipt of money or property in
addition to stock or securities will not keep the transaction out of § 112 (b) (4),
but it is hard to see how J 112 (e) puts an exchange solely for money or otherproperty into § 112 (b) (4). In the instant case it it not the fact that petitioner
received money or other property that keeps the transaction out of § 112 (b) (4),
but it is the fact that petitioner did not receive any stock or securities in the
exchange.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found that the instant transfer fell within§ 112 (b) (4) (or § 112 (b) (3) (?)) and the interpretation may be a precedent,
at least in the Seventh Circuit, as the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Pebble
Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 56, (1956).
The Commissioner may have urged that the payment of cash to petitioner, the
distribution of the cash to the petitioner's shareholders, and the purchase of stock
of Old Peoria by 75.9% of the petitioner's shareholders should be treated as one
transaction-that is, receipt of stock in Old Peoria by the petitioner's shareholders
for their interests in petitioner. By this argument petitioner would have con-
structively received stock of Old Peoria for petitioner's assets. Walter S. Heller,
2 T. C. 371 (1943); Morley Cypress Trust, Schedule "B," 3 T. C. 84 (1944);
Clyde Bacon, Inc., 4 T. C. 1107 (1945); and Ernest F. Becher, 22 T. C. 932(1954) would seem to sustain this argument, except for the fact that in those
cases stock of the transferee was received directly from the transferee by all of
the shareholders of the transferor and in the same proportion that the share-
holders held stock in the transferor.
If the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the "not only-but also" language
of § 112 (e) were carried to its logical extreme, it would appear that the "public"
shareholders who owned 24.1% of petitioner's stock and received a liquidating
dividend of cash and property in kind could not recognize any loss on the trans-
action, if the total payments did not equal their basis in the stock, as under § 112(b) (3) they transferred stock for money and other property pursuant to the
"plan of reorganization." The Court of Appeals, however, most probably would
have recognized that these shareholders had terminated an interest in a business
venture, since they did not own any of the stock of Old Peoria, and would have
allowed the loss. This would produce an anomalous result, if there were a "re-
organization" of a corporation with respect to one shareholder-and not with
respect to another.
The Court of Appeals' interpretation could not work to the detriment of the
Government. As seen above, a taxpalyer could not deduct a loss; however, if a
taxpayer attempted to escape the recognition of a gain under the "not only-but
also" interpretation in that an exchange of stock or securities for money would
meet § 112 (b) (3), he would be faced with § 112 (c) (1) which requires recog-
nition of gain to the extent of the money or other property received-in this case,
the whole consideration.
" Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F. 2d 288, 294 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U. S. -, 77 Sup. Ct. 56 (1956).
7 The tax benefit lost to petitioner was limited to the amount of taxes it had
paid on its taxable income for the year of sale and the two years preceding the
sale. If the "sale" of the non-inventory assets had resulted in an allowable loss,
petitioner would have had an excess of deductions, and the question might then
arise as to whether petitioner could have utilized the excessive deduction for a
benefit to itself or its shareholders.
Petitioner at the time of liquidation had a bulk whiskey inventory with a fair
market value approximately $1,700,000.00 in excess of its basis to petitioner, and
petitioner distributed this inventory to its shareholders as a liquidating dividend
in kind. By the provisions of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115 (c), 53 STAT. 46(now I T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 331 (a)) such distribution would be treated
as a payment in exchange for the stock, and the shareholders would report any
gain from the exchange as a long-term or short-term capital gain (or loss),
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in as good a monetary position had the assets been transferred to any
person in the world, other than Old Peoria (or another corporation
"controlled" by petitioner's shareholders, if the transfer were pursuant
to a plan of reorganization as in the case of Old Peoria), 71 for
$98,045.24 (the $242,080.00 actual sale price to Old Peoria less the
$144,034.76 tax refund not obtained). Any sale price in excess of
$98,045.24 would have resulted in a greater amount of assets being avail-
able to petitioner for the final liquidating dividend to its shareholders.
The 657 "public" shareholders holding 24.1 percent of the stock
of petitioner were then "stuck" with a liquidating dividend consisting
only of a pro rata share of the legal assets of petitioner as an entity.72
dependent upon the holding period of the particular shareholder with respect to his
stock. However, if petitioner were determined to be a "collapsible corporation,"
such gaia would be treated as an ordinary gain, and not as capital. Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 117 (m), 53 STAT. 50 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341).
If petitioner had sold this appreciated inventory and distributed the cash pro-
ceeds of the sale to its 'shareholders, the tax result to the shareholders would be
unchanged, as receipt of property, or receipt of cash equal to the fair market
value of the property, would result in an identical amount of gain (or loss) to the
shareholders on the exchange of the stock. As regards petitioner, if it sold the
inventory only to such an extent as to realize gain equal to the previously un-
availed of deduction, it would incur no tax liability as a result of such sales, but
neither could it increase the refund due from the Government.
However, such a maneuver could result in a very great advantage to petitioner's
shareholders in another respect. A determination that petitioner was a "collapsible
corporation" at the time of the liquidation, whereby gains to petitioner's share-
holders on liquidation would be treated as ordinary income, rather than as
capital, could prejudice the shareholders, with the extent of the prejudice to any
individual shareholder dependent upon his basis in his stock and his other income.
Section 341 (c), which is new in the 1954 Code, provides a statutory rebuttable
presumption that a corporation is a "collapsible corporation" if certain property
(including manufactured inventories) comprises 50% or more of its total assets
(with cash being excluded from the computation of total assets). If any manu-
factured inventories were converted into cash by the corporation, then both the
numerator and the denominator would be reduced in computing the ratio which
must not exceed 50%; and an equal reduction of both the numerator and the
denominator of a fraction reduces the percentage thereby obtained I It would be
the "principal" shareholders who would be benefited by this maneuver, also, as
§ 341 (d) (1) provides that § 341 shall not apply to any particular shareholder
who does not own, actually and constructively more than 5% in value of the out-
standing stock.
" Apparently the "principal" shareholders did not bear a blood relation to one
another, so that no one shareholder would own actually and constructively 50%
or more of the capital stock of petitioner to come under Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 24 (b), 53 STAT. 16 (now INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 267), although this in-
formation is not definitely stated in the findings or opinions. However, if the
"principal" shareholders were found to be partners, either by making a joint
purchase of the non-inventory assets or with respect to an independent business.
each of them would own actually and constructively more than 50% of the total
value of the outstanding stock. Ibid.
" The Pebble Springs case approaches the fact situation which would result
in the largest possible loss to the "public" shareholders, for surely another
purchaser could have been found (had the shareholders known before the sale
what they knew after the tax litigation) who would have been willing to pay more
than $98,045.24 for the non-inventory assets. The facts of the actual case need
be modified in only one detail to produce the most extreme example. The tax
refund lost to petitioner (and its shareholders in the form of a reduced liquidating
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The eight "principal" shareholders not only received their pro rata
distributive share of the assets of petitioner, but also, due to owning
the capital stock of Old Peoria which now owns the assets, may have
acquired additional valuable rights. Assuming that the true market
value of the physical assets acquired by Old Peoria was exactly
$242,080.00, has Old Peoria as a legal entity actually acquired something
in addition to the physical assets?
(a) What is the tax basis of the property to Old Peoria? Section
113 (a) (7)73 indicates that the basis of the property to Old Peoria
is not the $242,080.00 cost to Old Peoria, but $793,508.54, the basis
of the property in the hands of petitioner..
(b) What depreciation deduction will be allowed to Old Peoria
in computing its taxable income for years subsequent to the acquisition?
Sections 23 (n), 113 (a) (7) and (b), and 114 (a) 74 provide that Old
Peoria will be allowed to compute depreciation using a basis, not of
its $242,080.00 cost, but of the $793,508.54 adjused basis of the prop-
erty in the hands of petitioner. Each additional dollar of depreciation
deduction thus acquired may leave an additional 300 or 52 in the
corporate till,75 available for distribution as dividends.
(c) If Old Peoria sells the assets acquired from petitioner immedi-
ately, or after holding them for a period of time, what will be the basis
for determining gain or loss to Old Peoria on the sale? Section 113 (a)
(7) and (b) 76 provides that the basis shall be $793,508.54 as adjusted
dividend) in the actual case was limited to the amount of taxes paid by petitioner
on its taxable income for the year of the sale and the two years preceding the sale,
against which the loss on the "sale" was attempted to be applied. If the taxable
earnings of petitioner had been greater for these years, then the loss from failing
to secure a refund would have been greater.
Assume that the taxable earnings of petitioner for the year of the sale and the
two preceding years was as much as $825,000.00. In such a situation, upon sale
to Old Peoria, the resultant assets available for a liquidating dividend would be
$242,080.00 (the sale price). However, if petitioner had abandoned the property,
a tax saving of $412,624.44 (52% of the $793,508.54 allowable loss (but see note
45 supra)) would have resulted from the disposition, leaving $412,624.44 available
for a liquidating dividend. Petitioners' "public" shareholders would have been
better off in such a case if the property were abandoned, rather than being "sold"
to Old Peoria. Of course, if the property were sold to someone other than
Old Peoria, the petitioner would realize greater economic benefits if the prop-
erty were sold for a consideration, rather than being abandoned, as the consequent
reduction of the tax saving would amount to only 52% of the consideration received.
Query, if a group of shareholders may form their private plan of reorganization,
would not the Pebble Springs rule set up the perfect "squeeze play" for the par-
ticipating shareholders, against the shareholders not let in on the plan?
" Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 113 (a) (7), 53 STAT. 40 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 362 (b)).
' Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 23 (n), 113 (a) (7), (b), 114 (a), 53 STAT. 12,
40 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167 (f), 362 (b), 1011).
" An actual benefit could be realized only if Old Peoria had taxable income,
after a provision for depreciation computed with respect to Old Peoria's $242,080.00
cost.
"' Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 113 (a) (7), (b), 53 STAT. 40 (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 362 (b), 1011).
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for depreciation of the property while the property is held by Old
Peoria.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 added additional requirements
for the type reorganization that was found to have been consummated in
the Pebble Springs case. However, if a court followed reasoning identi-
cal to that used in the decision in Pebble Springs, the same result might
well be reached under the 1954 Code.7 If the exchange were found to
be a reorganization under the 1954 Code, the transferee would get the
benefit not only of the advantages listed in (a) to (c) above, but also
of the carryovers enumerated in section 381.78
(3) Section 337 Nonrecognized Losses on Sales or Exchanges in Con-
nection with Certain Liquidations.
It has already been seen that the shareholders of petitioner, qua
shareholders, will be prejudiced if petitioner is not allowed to recognize
the loss incident to the sale of its non-inventory assets. If the Pebble
Springs plan of liquidation had been adopted after June 22, 1954, the
Pebble Springs fact situation might fall within the provisions of section
337, which is new in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as the business
" Section 368 (a) (1) (D) defines the type reorganization involved in the
Pebble Springs case as "a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets
to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or
more of its shareholders (including persons who were shareholders immediately
before the transfer), or any combination thereof, is in control of the corporation
to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock
or securities are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 354...."(Emphasis supplied. The italicized words were added in the 1954 Code.) The
presence of the words "one or more" would appear to remove any doubt as to a
requirement that all of the "old" shareholders must have an interest in the re-
organized corporation.
Applying the Pebble Springs "not only-but also" interpretation to § 354 (a) a
court might find that an exchange of stock or securities for money (a liquidating
dividend) is included. Section 354 (b) would then further require that the trans-
feree acquire substantially all of the assets of the transferor, and that stock,
securities, and other property received by the transferor as consideration for the
exchange be distributed to the transferor's shareholders. Old Peoria received
substantially all of petitioner's assets as of the time of the transfer, as petitioner
had previously transferred the whiskey inventory to its shareholders. Petitioner
did not receive any stock or securities of Old Peoria, but it would appear that
any stock or securities which were "received" were "distributed" in pursuance of
the plan of reorganization, along with the cash which was received.
A court might then use § 368 (a) (1) (D) as the "reorganization" required
in § 361, and, if it applied the Pebble Springs "not only-but also" interpretation
to §§ 361 (a) and (b) (2), it could possibly find that no loss could be allowed
on the exchange by petitioner of corporate property for money.
"The provisions for carryovers provided in § 381 are not to be elected by a
taxpayer, but are required in all cases of corporate acquisitions described in the
section. Not all of the provisions would constitute an advantage in every case
to the "reorganized" corporation; for example, § 381 (c) (2) requires the "re-
organized" corporation to succeed to the Retained Earnings balance of the "old"
corporation. Thus, a dividend paid by the "reorganized" corporation might be an
ordinary dividend due to the carryover, whereas it would have constituted a liqui-
dating dividend with respect to the operating success of the "reorganized" corpora-
tion.
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was wound up (within the meaning of the section) within twelve
month after adoption of the plan. If the transaction is within section
337, then a loss on the sale of the non-inventory assets, even to a
stranger, would be denied, and Old Peoria, or the stranger, would not
acquire the basis of petitioner in the assets.
The Pebble Springs fact situation falls within the general rule of
section 337,79 but section 337 (c) (1) provides that the section shall
not apply to any sale or exchange made by a "collapsible corporation
(as defined in section 341 (b) )." Section 341 (c) provides a rebuttable
presumption that petitioner was a collapsible corporation within the
meaning of section 341 (b), as the fair market value of its bulk whiskey
inventory, which was manufactured by it, comprised more than fifty per-
cent of the total fair market value of all its assets, and the fair market
value of the whiskey inventory was more than 120 percent of its basis
to petitioner.
However, the question of whether petitioner was a collapsible corpo-
ration would ultimately be one of fact. Petitioner would be a collapsible
corporation under the definition contained in section 341 (b) (1) if it
was formed or availed of principally for the manufacture of the whiskey
inventory with a view to realization of any profit on the inventory by
its shareholders, rather than by petitioner. In the determination of
whether petitioner was a collapsible corporation, the ultimate interests
of the "principal" shareholders and the "public" shareholders might be
in conflict. If petitioner was not a collapsible corporation, -then pe-
titioner would not obtain the tax refund, and the liquidating dividend
to all the shareholders would be reduced. However, if petitioner was a
collapsible corporation, then petitioner would secure the refund of taxes,
but there would be a side result. The "principal" shareholders by the
provisions of section 341 (a) would be required to treat any gain they
realized on the exchange of their stock as ordinary income, rather than
as capital gain. But section 341 (d) excepts any shareholder from
the provisions of section 341 (a) who does not own more than five
percent of the outstanding stock. Unless the vice-president or his wife
" A "chicken and the egg" problem could be presented in determining if pe-
titioner came within the general rule of § 337, if petitioner had been suing for a
refund. Petitioner must have distributed all of its assets within a period of twelve
months following the adoption of the plan of liquidation, if it is to be within the
general rule. But if petitioner were suing for a tax refund of $144,034.76, would
not this claim constitut6 an asset? If the claim did constitute an asset, and pe-
titioner had not sold or assigned the claim, then would petitioner have dis-
tributed all its assets? Thus, whether the claim was good might depend on
whether petitioner had distributed all its assets, and whether petitioner had dis-
tributed all its assets might depend upon whether the claim was good. In order
to avoid such a question, it might be advisable to formally assign any claim for a
tax refund to the shareholders, if the taxpayer would be benefited by applicability
of § 337.
[Vol. 35
1956] SOME EFFECTS OF NONRECOGNIZED LOSSES 57
is related by blood or marriage to one or more of the other shareholders,
it would appear that he could join the "public" shareholders in this
round, as a shareholder must own more than five percent of the out-
standing stock.
In determining if petitioner was availed of to manufacture inventory
which would be distributed to its shareholders, rather than being sold
by the petitioner, the Regulations provide that the "requirement is sat-
isfied whether such action was contemplated, unconditionally, condi-
tionally, or as a recognized possibility."80 But if the distribution was
attributable "solely to circumstances which arose after the manufacture
... (other than circumstances which reasonably could be anticipated at
the time of such manufacture ... ) the corporation shall, in the absence
of compelling facts to the contrary, be considered not to have been so
formed or availed of." 81  Since petitioner was purportedly liquidated
due to a poor future outlook for the distillery industry, it would appear
that evidence would have to be introduced as to when such a state of
affairs arose, and whether the policy makers of petitioner should "rea-
sonably 8 2 have anticipated at the time of manufacture that the inventory
so manufactured would be distributed as a liquidating dividend in kind
to the shareholders.
Due to the applicability of section 337 to a net loss on sales incident
to liquidation, the "public" shareholders would try to establish that
petitioner was a collapsible corporation, and the presumption of section
341 (c) would be in their favor. In defending the suit for refund of
taxes, the Commissioner would be endowed with the burden of proof
in establishing that petitioner was not a collapsible corporation!
(C) PLACING OF RESTRICTIONS ON SALES OF THE CORPORATE PROPERTY
TO AVOID NONRECOGNITION OF A Loss INCIDENT TO SUCH SALE.
(1) Preventive Action by Shareholders.
In the case of a statutory merger or consolidation or a sale of a
profitable business and dissolution of the old corporation, the proposed
action must be submitted to a vote of the shareholders, although many
states no longer require that there be unanimous assent to the action.8 3
If a corporation owns property with an adjusted basis in excess of
the market value of the property and has taxable income for the year
of the sale or for the two preceding years (or expects to have taxable
income in the succeeding five year period) against which a loss on a sale
80U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.341-2 (a) (2), T. D. 6152 (1955).81Id. § 1.341-2 (a) (3).
".-The Regulations do not indicate whether the test is to be subjective or ob-
jective. Quite a factual question would be presented if the court was required
to look into the business background and experience of each person exercising any
control over the business.
"' See note 50 supra.
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of such property might be offset, the shareholders in their own best
interests should consider restricting the sale of such property. In the
case of a sale of the business, or substantially all of its assets, the corpo-
ration must avoid sections 267, 337, and 361, or it may lose the benefit
of claiming a loss. If the property is sold to an individual, the purchaser
should be required to warrant that he is not one of the persons, or act-
ing as agent for one of the persons, specified in section 267 with respect
to the corporation. If the purchaser is a corporation, or an individual
who is acting as an agent for a corporation, then, unless the shareholders
intend that there actually be a reorganization, the purchaser should be
required to warrant that the transferee is not "controlled" by one or
more shareholders of the transferor within the meaning of section 368.
When there is a plan to liquidate completely, the corporation must
adopt a plan which will not be carried out within twelve months, or
section 337, which was intended to be the taxpayer's friend, may turn
out to be a faux ami.
Unless the authorization for a sale of the corporation's assets incident
to liquidation is so restricted, then each individual shareholder should
consider all of the circumstances in order to decide whether he should
dissent from the vote and demand that the corporation purchase his
shares.8 4
In the case of a sale of a portion of the corporation's assets in the
ordinary course of business, authorization for the sale need not ordinarily
be obtained from the shareholders, as the directors have authority to
make such a sale implied from their authority to conduct the corpora-
tion's ordinary business.8 5 The shareholders should, however, pass a
by-law requiring that a purchaser of any of the corporation's assets
(other than ordinary sales of inventory) warrant that he is not one of
the persons referred to in section 267 with respect to the corporation,
when the property being sold has an adjusted basis in excess of the sale
price. Such a by-law would limit the authority of the directors in making
a sale.88
This preventive action by the shareholders would prevent a "loss"
to the corporation in some situations. Of course, if there is bad faith
on the part of a majority of the shareholders, such shareholders might
not vote for the by-law, but such refusal could be quite beneficial if
parties who are injured attempt to establish the fact of bad faith in an
action in tort for misfeasance.
" See note 50 mtpra.
s1 See 13 Am. Jui., Corporations § 963 (1938) ; 19 C. J. S., Corporations § 1038
(1940) ; BA.LAxNiTE, CORPoRATIoNs § 42 (1946).
"See 13 Am. JuR., Corporations § 947 (1938); 19 C. J. S., Corporations
§ 742 (1940).
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(2) Preventive Action by Directors.
Directors of a corporation in discharging their duties have a positive
duty to use diligence, skill, and good faith to safeguard the assets of the
corporation and in all ways to serve the best interests of the corpora-
tion.87 Even if the shareholders fail to restrict their authorization for
a sale, or if no authorization by the shareholders is needed for a sale,
the directors in order to protect themselves from possible legal liability
to the corporation for malfeasance and neglect, and in order to fulfill
their moral duty to the corporation even if no legal liability would
result, should take steps to insure that the property is not sold in such
manner that the corporation would not be allowed to recognize a loss on
the sale. 88
(D) CHANGES THAT SHOULD BE MADE IN THE RE ENUE LAWS TO
RE OVE INEQUITIES.
(1) Section 267.
Section 267, in stating an absolute prohibition against the allowance
of any loss on a sale or exchange of property between the persons speci-
fied in the section, results in an injustice to the transferor of the property
in many cases to which it applies. The purpose of the provisions ap-
pears to be to prevent the creation of artificial losses between persons
whom it is believed have identical economic interests, whereby a sale or
exchange may be merely "superficial" in order to create a tax loss, with
the property actually remaining within the economic sphere of control
of the transferor. The transferor has then forever lost the right to
recognize on his reports of income for tax purposes the fact that his
total tax basis in all his legal property has been diminished-by the
transfer of property with one basis out of his legal possession, and
" See 13 Am. JuR., Corporations §§ 985-1001 (1938) ; 19 C. J. S., Corporations
§§ 761-836 (1940); STFvENRs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRiVATE CORPORATIONS§§ 151-54 (1949); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 62-66 (1946).
"8 "A purchase by a stockholder, especially an officer of the corporation, is
regarded in the same light as a purchase by a trustee of the property of a cestui
que trust. Such a purchase is not void but voidable at the election of the cestui
que trust. A court of equity will scrutinize such a transaction closely and will
set it aside upon a very slight showing of advantage taken or bad faith. Even
where the majority of the stockholders of a corporation are authorized by statute
to dissolve the corporation and sell its property and divide the proceeds, despite
the opposition of the minority stockholders, they cannot exercise their powers
in a way to buy the property for themselves and exclude the minority from a fair
participation in the fruits of the sale. A sale of corporate assets by a majority
stockholder to himself for less then he could obtain from another is voidable
at the instance of a minority stockholder." 13 Am. JuR., Corporations § 1219, at
1115 (1938). See also 19 C. J. S., Corporations § 775 (1940) ; STEVENS, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 126, 147-48 (1949); BALLENTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 66 (1946).
Query whether the possibility of securing future tax benefits would be such a
property right as to invoke the powers of protection of a court of equity?
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acquisition of other property with a smaller tax basis in exchange. Good
faith, arm's length dealings with respect to property with an adjusted
basis greater than the market value are thus hampered, if not prohibited,
between the individuals specified in the section.
Section 267 should be amended to provide the following particulats:
(a) If the property has not in fact passed out of the economic
sphere of control of the transferor, no loss should be allowed to the
transferor at the time of the transfer, and there should be a presumption
that property has not passed out of the economic sphere of control of
a transferor when property is transferred to any one of the persons
specified within section 267. However, if the transferor proves to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that the sale was in fact made in good
faith, that the transferor did not have as a principal purpose the securing
of an income tax benefit, that the transfer price was determined through
arm's length negotiations, that the transfer price closely approximated
the actual fair market value of the property, and that the property did
in fact, as a result of the sale, pass out of the economic sphere of control
of the transferor, the transferor should be allowed to recognize a loss
on the sale, as if the transferee were not one of the persons specified
within section 267.
(b) In the event that a transferor of property is not allowed to
recognize a loss at the time of a transfer by him, due solelr to the
provisions of section 267, the transferor should retain a "potential loss"
for tax purposes, which should be the difference between the adjusted
basis of the property to the transferor and the transfer price or the fair
market value of the property at the time of the transfer, whichever pro-
duces the smaller8 9 "potential loss." The burden should be on the
transferor to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner the fair
market value of such property, and any determination made by the
Commissioner of the fair market value should be final, in the absence of
a showing by the transferor of actual fraud or bad faith on the part of
the Commissioner in making the determination. If the property actually
passes out of the hands of all persons bearing a section 267 relation to
the transferor, and actually passes out of the economic sphere of control
of the transferor by any means whatsoever, at any time subsequent to
the original transfer, but during the joint lives of the transferor and
the original transferee, then the transferor should be allowed to report
the erstwhile "potential loss" for the taxable year in which such further
transfer occurs.
(c) The present provisions of section 267 (c) should be deleted,
"If the transfer price is less than the market value of the property, then the
transferor has made a gift to the transferor and should not expect ever to be
allowed a loss for any part of the gift.
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and the basis of the property to the transferee should for all purposes
be his actual cost, whether the transferor is allowed to recognize a
loss or not.
It is believed by the writer that these changes would remove the
present inequities inherent in section 267, without adding an unreason-
able burden to the process of administration of the section.
(2) Section 337.
Section 337 should be amended to provide that the section does
not apply to any case in which a corporation sustains a net loss
from liquidation sales of all its assets, but that such net loss might
be recognized by a corporation, as if the section did not exist. Such
an amendment would allow a corporation to treat a net loss on the
liquidation of all its assets as an adjustment of profits previously re-
ported over the life of the business venture, and would partially remove
the presently existing trap for the "unwary" who might unknowingly
consummate a liquidation which would come within the provisions of
the section.
The section should be further amended to close the presently exist-
ing loophole regarding sales of "loss" property before the adoption of a
plan of liquidation, with consequent recognition of a loss deduction, and
sales of "gain" property after the adoption of a section 337 plan of
liquidation, with consequent nonrecognition of gain. Such amendatory
provisions could very well comprehend a test of "good faith" as to the
actual date of adoption of a "plan" of liquidation by a corporation, or
a hard and fast period of time preceding a section 337 liquidation period
for which "loss" sales or exchanges of assets would be required to be
treated as liquidation sales or exchanges, if the taxpayer were to derive
the benefits of section 337 on sales and exchanges during the liquida-
tion period.
The present writer does not agree in theory with either the holding
in United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. or section 337 that a
corporation should be allowed to distribute to its shareholders, or itself
sell, any property subject to depreciation or cost depletion without ac-
counting at that time for the difference between the fair market value of
the property and its adjusted basis, as the writer believes that such
difference represents an adjustment of claimed deductions for prior
periods. However, if an inequity exists in this respect, it is an inequity
to all other taxpayers who are providing the fiscal needs of the Govern-
ment, rather than a penalty injurious to one "unwary" taxpayer, as in the
case of the denial of a net loss on sales incident to liquidation.
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(3) Section 361.
Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner is indicative of the
injustice that can result when there is an "accidental" reorganization of
a corporation. A "plan of reorganization" is required in all cases in
order that there be a reorganization for tax purposes. The term, a
"plan of reorganization," should be specifically defined in the Internal
Revenue Code so that all persons might know exactly what a "plan of
reorganization" is and, in particular, who may formulate such a plan.
"Accidental" reorganizations might then be guarded against by per-
sons who would be adversely affected thereby, and, if a reorganization
did result with prejudicial effects on some of the shareholders or credi-
tors, the "planners" sh6uld be chargeable with knowledge that they had
"planned."
The writer makes no suggestion as to legislation to overrule the
interpretation applied by the Court of Appeals in Pebble Springs to
what are now sections 356 (c) and 361 (b) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The provisions of the Code seem clearly to exclude the
Pebble Springs situation, but the Congress, if it wishes, might resort
to semantics and add immediately after sections 356 (c) and 361 (b) (2)
in parentheses, "and we really mean it."
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